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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. ORIGIN OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
Spendthrift trusts have long been favorites of the
Pennsylvania courts and it was in Pennsylvania that they
had their origin.1 Not only was it the first jurisdiction to
recognize this type of trust, but, with a single exception
hereinafter noted, it has consistently upheld them in their
entirety.2 The age-old tendency at common law has been
to frown upon restraints on alienation,8 and it has become
axiomatic in the law that where one holds a title in fee or
for life he may not enjoy the benefits flowing therefrom
without the necessarily attendant burden of liability to his
creditors.4  Since the incidents which attach to the legal
title also apply to an absolute equitable interest, the doc-
trine of spendthrift trusts, although definitely established
in the law of Pennsylvania and other states, has never
found favor in England and the English courts do not rec-
ognize such trusts.6
It has been noted that the doctrine of spendthrift trusts
originated in Pennsylvania." The particular case in
which it was first enunciated is Fisher v. Taylor.6 In this
case a father made a gift in trust for his son for life with-
out liability for his debts with remainder over to his heirs.
The son's equitable interest was taken in execution by the
sheriff and sold by him. The purchaser at the sheriff's sale
'Gray, Restraints on Alienation of Property (2d. ed. 1895) 214-235.
(References are to paragraphs).
2Gray, supra, 214-235; 76 U. Pa. Law Rev. 220.
6Gray, supra, 4.
42 Coke, Littleton 30; Lewin, Trusts (12th ed. 1911); Brandon v.
Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr., 429 (Eng., 1811); 74 U. Pa. Law Rev. 496.
51 Perry on Trusts 386a (1911).
674 U. Pa. Law Rev. 496. But it should be noted that the Eng-
lish courts have developed the separate use trust, if plainly ex-
pressed in the instrument, for the protection of married women;
Lewin, supra, note 2, p. 986 et seq., and Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl.
& Cr. 377 (Eng. 1840). See also Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483,
487 (Eng. 1817).
'See note 1, supra.
62Rawle 33 (Pa.-1829).
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brought an action of ejectment against the trustees. In
this action it is to be noted that the purchaser could not
succeed for his rights could rise no higher than his debtor's
and the debtor had only an equitable interest in this active
trust.9 In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Smith by
way of dictum stated that a man had a right to dispose of
his property in any manner he pleased, and consequently
had a right to make a provision for his son which could not
be taken away from him for the payment of any debts that
he might contract, and, moreover, that there was no rule
of law which prohibited such disposition of the parent's es-
tate. The court lost sight of the fact that there was a posi-
tive rule of law that covered just such a case, to-wit, the
acts making all property liable for debts.10 From this loose
dictum has grown up in Pennsylvania and other states the
doctrine of spendthrift trusts.
An interesting theory explaining the origin of this type
of trust in Pennsylvania has been advanced by Mr. Gray.11
According to this theory, spendthrift trusts first made their
appearance in Pennsylvania because of the fact that, since
originally there were no courts of equity in this state, there
was no method by which equitable rights could be enforced.
Thus in order to give such a remedy, many equitable rights
were turned into legal rights by the following means: first,
by extending the operation of the statute of uses to a use
of personal property ;12 and, second, by considering as exe-
cuted trusts some which in other states would be considered
as active, and therefore not executed by the Statute of
Uses. 3 Mr. Gray then proceeds by stating that equitable
rights in land could be taken on execution by legal process,
but when spendthrift trusts made their appearance, the
courts were hesitant to permit the taking of the compli-
9Foulke, Rules Against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation
and Restraints on Enjoyment (1909) 291-3. (References are to para-
graphs).
'0 Foulke, supra, 291-3.
"lGray, supra, 214 et seq.
22For the expression of a contrary view by a Pennsylvania au.
thor see Foulke, supra, 123.
3See Foulke, supra, 132, 133.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
cated interests of the cestui que trust under legal process.
When equitable jurisdiction was finally established in 1836
the doctrine of spendthrift trusts was too strong to be
shaken off. This theory has been the subject of criticism. 1'
B. DEVELOPMENT OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
0 IN PENNSYLVANIA
Fisher v. Taylor"5 was the forerunner of numerous de-
cisions in Pennsylvania, all of which seized upon the dictum
of that famous case to develop the doctrine of spendthrift
trusts. Some of the more important of these cases will be
noted here.
Chief Justice Gibson in Holdship v. Patterson"' ruled
that a benefactor may provide a trust for a friend without
exposing said bounty to the debts or improvidence of the
beneficiary and that the beneficiary has an individual right
of property in the execution of the trust of which he can-
not be deprived by an execution against the trustee. With
such an authority as Chief justice Gibson favoring the doc-
trine of spendthrift trusts it is no wonder that later Penn-
sylvania judges viewed such trusts with favor.
Another interesting case is that of Ashhurst v. Given."'
Here the court held that a spendthrift trust in the hands
of the trustee was not subject to execution for the debts
of the improvident son contracted previous to the devise
creating the trust fund. The next year in Vaux v. Parke,"s
Mr. Justice Sergeant stated that where land was devised
by a father to certain trustees in trust for his spendthrift
son, such a son had no interest in the land which could be
seized and sold by execution on a judgment obtained
against him.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Girard v. Cham-
bers9 held that in order for a restriction upon alienation,
14Foulke, supra, 123 et seq.
152 Rawle 33 (Pa.-1829).
167 Watts 547 (Pa.-1838).
175 W. & S. 323 (Pa.-1843).
187 W. & S. 19 (Pa.-1844).
1046 Pa. 485 (1864). See also Holdship v. Patterson, supra;
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
such as exists in a spendthrift trust, to be effective it had
to be expressed in the instrument creating the trust. For
a generation this strict rule was followed. However, in
1890 in the case of Stambaugh's Estate,20 the rule of the
Girard case was departed from completely. It is with this
case that the doctrine of spendthrift trusts in Pennsylva-
nia reached its full flower, the Supreme Court going so far
as to say that even though the instrument itself does not
give evidence of an intention to create a spendthrift trust,
nevertheless, if from the surrounding circumstances a reas-
onable inference may be gathered that such was the object
of the testator, that inference will govern the court.
In this case, evidence of the insolvency of the beneficiary
at the time the trust was created was admitted by the
court and this fact was held to be sufficient evidence of an
intention to create a spendthrift trust. To quote from the
court at page 597:
"It is said, however, that we must search only for
the intent of a testator within the four corners of the
will. This is true, but, when we come to consider the
will and interpret its meaning, we must do so in the
light of all the circumstances by which the testator
was surrounded when he made it, and by which he was
probably influenced."
Later Pennsylvania cases repudiate the rule of the
Stambaugh case, and in Shoup's Estate,"' the court criticises
the holding. In the latter case the court held that the
mere fact that a testator left a portion of his estate to a
daughter absolutely and another portion to a son in trust
to receive the income only, raises no presumption that he
intended to create a spendthrift trust for the son, nor in
such a case will evidence be admitted, in order to establish
Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. 113 (1865); Still v. Spear, 45 Pa. 168
(1863); Dean Trickett on Spendthrift Trusts for Their Creators, 12
Dick. L. Rev. 265; Creation of a Spendthrift Trust, 74 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 496 (1925-6).
20135 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 1058 (1890).
2131 Pa. Super. Ct. 162 (1906).
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a spendthrift trust, that the son was insolvent and incapa-
ble of making a living for himself.
Today, the rule of the Stambaugh case is not followed
as noted in the case of Shoup's Estate.2  This is further
emphasized by the holding of the court in McCurdy v. Belle-
fonte,'2 wherein there was a will by a mother creating a
trust for her son, but it contained no suggestion that the
trust fund should be exempt from the reach of the son's
creditors, or that he had any creditors except the testatrix,
or that he was improvident and a spendthrift. Mr. Justice
Walling in view of these facts held that the court would
not construe the will so as to create a spendthrift trust.
"Spendthrift trusts are not regarded with disfa-
vor, yet they are not looked upon with such special
favor as to warrant the courts in construing a trust to
pay the income of a fund to the testator's son for life,
without more, to be a spendthrift trust."'
'
2
The rule in Pennsylvania today, to use the court's lan-
guage again, is that:
"A trust will not be construed of the spendthrift
kind, unless the language of the instrument by which
it is created warrants the construction.
'2 5
Thus over half a century later the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court iterates the rule of the case of Girard v.
Chambers, 2 and reinstates it as the law.
C. REACHING THE INTEREST OF THE
BENEFICIARY
Spendthrift trusts in Pennsylvania have been sustained
upon the theory that the donor has a right to control the
22Supra, note 21.
23292 Pa. 407, 141 At. 247 (1928).
24Ibid. at pp. 410-411.
25Ibid. at p. 411.
26Supra. note 19.
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disposition of his property.27  This viewpoint loses sight
of the fact that ordinarily all property is liable for debts. 28
The control of the donor over the disposition of his prop-
erty is exemplified in the case of Mehaffey's Estate,9
wherein a testator created certain spendthrift trusts and
the question arose as to what were the rights of a creditor
of the cestui que trust as against the trust property. Mr.
Justice Sterrett said:
"It is well settled by an unbroken line of cases
commencing with Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33, that,
by using apt words, a parent may create a special trust
for the benefit of an unfortunate or a spendthrift child,
without exposing his bounty to liability for any debts,
contracts, or engagements of the beneficiary. 30  -
The very purpose of a spendthrift trust is to provide a
source of income or a principal fund for a beneficiary which
cannot be reached by his creditors. In Pennsylvania this
purpose has been accomplished with but one notable excep-
tion, to be noted later. A review of some of the cases on
this point readily discloses the efficacy of such a type of
trust. It has often been held that the principal and income
of a spendthrift trust cannot be attached,81 nor is a legacy
21Morgan's Estate, No. 1, 223 Pa. 228, 72 Atl. 498, 25 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 236 (1909); Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882); Holdship
v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547 (Pa..-1838). See also Beck's Estate, 133 Pa.
51, 19 At. 302, 2 A. L. R. 859, 59 A. L. R. 790 (1890); Goe's Estate,
146 Pa. 431, 23 Atl. 383, 2 A. L. R. 860 (1891); and Prentice v. Pleas-
anton, 8 AtL 842, (Pa.-1887).
2'See supra, note 10.
29139 Pa. 276, 20 AtL 1056 (1890).
8OIbid., at p. 281.
9tEllwanger v. Moore, 206 Pa. 234, 55 AtL 66 (1903); Thackara
v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882); Seitzinger's Estate, 170 Pa. 500, 32
Atl. 1097 (1895)-this latter case reveiws many of the earlier deci-
sions on this subject at pp. 514-519. See also Wright's Estate, 12
District 321 (Pa.-1903); Root's Estate, 8 Lancaster Rev. 153 (Pa.-
1891); Kreamer's Executors v. Showalter et al., 1 C. C. 453 (Pa.
1886; Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa. 276 (1878); Philadelphia v. Lock-
ard, 198 Pa. 572, 48 Att. 496 (1901) ; 2 Troubat & Haly on Pennsylva-
nia Practice, p. 1642; Schmidt's Estate, 5 D. & C. 470 (Pa.-1924);
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attachable in the hands of an executor where it is given
upon the express condition that it shall not be attached
or seized for the debts of the legatee.32  In the case of
Thackara v. Mintzer5 it was ruled that attachment execution
would not lie to recover income due the cestui que trust.
The earlier Pennsylvania cases were not in accord as
to whether the court could apply the interest of a bene-
ficiary of a spendthrift trust for the support of his wife
and children.3' At the turn of the century the rule ap-
peared to be established that the beneficiary's interest in
such a trust was not subject to alienability for the support
of his wife and children. 5 The remedy for such a situa-
tion lay in legislation36 and in 1913 an act was passed for
support arrears with this in view.37 In 1917 a section of
the Wills Act was devoted to providing that spendthrift
trusts were subject to attachment for the support and
maintenance of the wife and minor children of the bene-
ficiary.38
Davies v. Harrison, 3 D. & C. 481 (Pa.-1923).
32Beck's Estate, 133 Pa. 51, 19 Atl. 302, 2 A. L. R. 859, 59 A. L. R.
790 (1890); Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. 431, 23 AtL 383, 2 A. L. R. 860
(1891); and Prentice v. Pleasanton, 8 Atl. 842, (Pa.-1887).
3B100 Pa. 151, 35 A. L. R. 1036, 59 A. L. R. 790 (1882).
"Recovery allowed in: Board of Charities v. Moore, 6 Pa. C. C.
66 (1888); Board of Charities v. Kennedy, 3 Pa. District 231 (1894).
See also Decker v. Poor Directors, 120 Pa. 272, 13 AtL 925 (1888).
Recovery denied in Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151, 35 A. L. R. 1036,
59 A. L. R. 790 (1882).
35Board of Charities v. Lockard, 198 Pa. 572, 48 AtL 496 (1901),
reversing Philadelphia v. Lockard, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 569 (1900).
56See 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 496 (1925-6), Creation of a Spendthrift
Trust.
8TAct of April 15, 1913, P. L. 72 amending Section 2 of the Act
of March 5, 1907, P. L. 6.
'sWills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, sec. 19 (20 P. S. 243).
The Note of the Commissioners appointed to Codify and Revise
the Law of Decedents Estates to this section (see page 72 of their
Report) is enlightening. It is as follows:
"The Commissioners have been impressed with the evil arising
from the abuse of the doctrine of spendthrift trusts in this Common-
wealth. The decisions of the courts hold it legal for a testator in dis-
posing of his own property to bequeath it in trust so that it shall not
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The next statutory expression occurred in 1921, when
the Assembly passed an act providing for the alienability
of spendthrift trusts for the support of the beneficiary's
wife or children or both. 9
With these statutes and with the comparatively recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Moorhead's Estate,"0 the
law on this point at the present time may definitely be
stated to be that the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift
trust may be reached for the support of his wife and chil-
dren.
A spendthrift trust created by a beneficiary for his
own benefit was able to be reached for the support of his
wife even before the passage of the aforementiond stat-
utes. 1
Spendthrift trusts because of their very nature are
generally active trusts, 42 and a creditor's claim against a
spendthrift trust for the tort of the beneficiary is no better
be liable for the debts of the beneficiary; but it is believed that this
protection should not be afforded to prevent the application of the
income to the support and maintenance of the family of the bene-
ficiary, and enable him to escape his marital and parental duties.
"Since the present act is to apply only to the estates of persons
dying after its approval, this section does not fall within the opinion
in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 275 (1916), holding
the Act of 1913 invalid as to the estates of testators dying before
the date of that act." Cf. Com. v. Cozens, 25 District 177 (Pa.-
1916).
' 9Act of May 10, 1921, P. L. 434, 48 P. S. 136. This Act held con-
stitutional in Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super. Ct. 184 (126). The
fact that the Act is retroactive does not make it unconstitutional:
Moorhead v. Watt, 75 Pitts. L. J. 249 (Pa.-1927) affirmed in 289 Pa.
542 without discussion of this point; but see Weightman v. Weight-
man, 4 D. & C. 252 (Pa.-1924) for a contrary view.
40289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802, 52 A. L. R. 1259 (1927), affirming 75
Pitts. L, J. 249 (Pa.-1927). See also (1928) 41 Harv. Law Rev. 409;
(1928) 76 U. Pa. Law Rev. 220; (1929) 43 Harv. Law Rev. 63-5.
diPhiladelphia v. Meredith, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 600 (1910), affirming
20 District 22 (Pa.-1910). Cf. Young's Estate, 17 District 597 (Pa.-
1907).
,2 Shower's Estate, 211 Pa. 297, 60 Atd. 789 (1905); Minnich's Es-
tate, 206 Pa. 405, 55 Atl. 1067 (1903); and Winthrop v. Clinton, 196
Pa. 472, 46 AtL (1882).
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than that of a creditor whose claim is founded on con-
tract.4 38  A dictum in Thackara v. Mintzer" states that:
"Whether the judgment be for breach of contract
or for a tort matters not. The testator recognized no
such distinction.
' ' 5
In addition to the wife and children of the beneficiary,
others who have been able to reach spendthrift trusts have
been the state,"6 the trustee,47 the executor of the settlor,"
and various persons who may be representatives of the
4'Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882).
"Ibid.
45Ibid., pp. 154-155. See also Wright's Estate, 12 District 321
(Pa.-1903); Davies v. Harrison, 3 D. & C. 481 (Pa.-1923). For a
criticism of this viewpoint see 43 Harv. L. Rev. 63 at 80, 81.
"6Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 Atl. 408 (1924), in which a luna-
tic who was supported by the Commonwealth had a spendthrift
trust established for his benefit, with the power given to the trustee
to expend principal or income if necessary, for his care and bene-
fit. The court held that the Commonwealth was entitled to reim-
bursement for moneys paid on his behalf from the fund so created,
but only from the outlays made from the date of the creation of the
trust and not for the periods prior thereto. See also In Re Spang-
ler, 3 D. & C. 616 (Pa.-1923).
47It has been held that the trustee may reimburse himself out of
the income of a spendthrift for a considerable expense incurred in the
administration of the trust at the instance of the beneficiary; Thaw's
Estate, 252 Pa. 99, 97 Atl. 108 (1916). In McCurdy's Estate, 3 D. &
C. 735 (Pa.-1923) the trustee was permitted to set off against the
executor of the beneficiary the amount due the trustee on a judg-
ment against the beneficiary; moreover, a trustee may take credit in
his accounts for advancements to the beneficiary before the income
has actually accrued in the trustee's hands: King's Estate, 147 Pa.
410, 23 Atl. 603, (1892); Keen's Estate, 293 Pa. 267, 142 AtL 209
(1928); Jones Estate, 199 Pa. 143, 48 Atl. 865 (1901); Shuster's Es-
tate, 26 District 232 (Pa.-191 7 ).
"Sharp v. Wightman, 205 Pa. 285, 54 Atl. 888 (1903); Elwart's
Estate, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 321 (1913).
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cestui que trust, such as his guardian, 9 administrator,"0
receiver, 51 or trustee in bankruptcy.
2
D. CONCLUSION
It may therefore be said with a degree of certainty
that the doctrine of spendthrift trusts exists in Pennsyl-
vania today not quite in its entirety, but nearly so. The
notable exception is that such a trust may be reached for
the support of the wife and children of the beneficiary.
Other scattered exceptions have been mentioned above.
No longer do the Pennsylvania courts look to extrinsic cir-
cumstances to determine whether or not the creator in-
tended to make a spendthrift trust, but, on the contrary, a
restriction upon alienation such as exists in a spendthrift
trust to be effective must be expressed in the instrument
creating the trust.
NICHOLAS UNKOVIC.
'69Everhart's Estate, 296 Pa. 94, 145 At. 702 (1929).
450McCurdy's Estate, 3 D. & C. 735 (Pa.-1923), holding that the
income after it has been paid to the executor of the beneficiary was
liable for the beneficiary's debts.
81Mintzer v. Mintzer, 15 Phila. 161 (Pa.-1881).
S .See cases cited in 43 Harv. Law Rev. 63, at p. 73 et seq.
